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Japanese Corporate Governance at a Crossroads:
Variation in 'Varieties of Capitalism'?
Luke Nottaget
The numbers coming out of Tokyo do not lie.
Unemployment and bankruptcies are at their post-1940s peak.
GNP shrank in 1998 ... [Japan's] government deficit... as a
percentage of GDP, is among the highest in the OECD. The
Tokyo Stock Exchange languished for over a decade .... Real
estate prices have fallen more than 60 percent .... Most of the
nation's banks would be insolvent if Japan followed Western
accounting standards... if higher interest rates return or the yen
does not soon weaken, a range of Japanese manufacturers that
have been kept alive since the mid-nineties on the life support of
a weak currency and extremely low interest rates will not
survive.
Yet the sense remains that, irrespective of whatever political
difficulties may stand in the way of getting the country moving
again, Japan's policy elite doesn't really think things are that
bad ....
Taken together, Tokyo's policy moves paint a portrait of
befuddlement, uncertainty, and serious internal rifts. Banking
crises are the financial equivalent of fires: one expects alarm,
panic, firemen rushing to the scene; what one doesn't expect are
groups of obviously capable firemen standing around debating
whether there really is or isn't a fire; if there is, should we be
using water to put it out, or might we run out of water, so maybe
it would be better to try one of those new chemical
extinguishers-except that the bill for that would be too high? In
the meantime, a whole field of bystanders jumps up and down
shouting, 'Put out the bloody fire before it burns our houses
too!' So the firemen feel they must look busy but don't really
do much.'
t Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney Law Faculty; Barrister of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales. B.C.A.ILL.B., 1989, Victoria University of Wellington;
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
I. Revisiting 'Varieties of Capitalism': Corporate
Governance as Stakeholder Contracts
Poor economic performance in the United States during the
1980s led to intriguing attempts to reconceptualize the essential
elements of successful capitalism through comparative analysis.
Some theorists examined economic achievements and structures in
Japan and East Asia, but considerable collaborative research
focused more on developments in Europe. One influential strand
in the latter research argued that markets were only one
institutional mechanism for coordinating economic activity, and
that all these mechanisms were shaped by and shapers of "social
systems of production (SSPs)," meaning:
[T]he way that the following institutions or structures of a region
or structures of a country or a region are integrated into a social
configuration: the industrial relations system; the system of
training of workers and managers; the internal structure of
corporate firms; the structured relationships among firms in the
same industry on the one hand, and on the other firms'
relationships with their suppliers and customers; the financial
markets of a society; the conceptions of fairness and justice held
by capital and labor; the structure of the state and its policies;
and a society's idiosyncratic customs and traditions as well as its
LL.M., 1992, Kyoto University Law Faculty. E-mail luken@law.usyd.edu.au.
This is an expanded and updated version of a paper originally presented at the
annual Kyushu University/Thammasat University conference, "Economic Law Reform
in the Aftermath of the Asian Crisis: Experiences of Japan and Thailand," Bangkok,
March 20-21, 2000. For help in preparing that paper, I am grateful to my former
colleagues at Kyushu University in Japan, Tom Ginsburg and Lorenz Kodderitzsch, and
to several generations of LL.M. students who took my class there on "Joint Venturing in
Japan" from 1997-99, especially Eric Sibbitt. For subsequent feedback and information,
I thank participants at the conference, and a seminar at the University of Victoria, at
which I presented a first revised version of the paper on February 14, 2001, as well as
David Harvey, Gary Hawke, Jennifer Hill, Jerry Markham, Martin Rhodes, Michael
Ryland, and Jonathan Zeitlin. I am also grateful to Christian Joerges for encouraging me
to attend his joint seminar, "The Economy as Polity," at the European University
Institute (EUI) in Florence, late 2000, which prompted me to explore the literature
mentioned in Parts I and V of this article. A longer version of this article appears under
the same title as EUI Working Paper in Law No. 2001/8, at http://www.iue.it/LAW, and
in THE MULTIPLE WORDS OF JAPANESE LAW: DISJUNCTIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS 66 (Tom
Ginsberg et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.capi.uvic.ca.
I R. Taggart Murphy, Japan's Economic Crisis, I NEW LEFT REV. 25, 27-28, 30
(2000).
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norms, moral principles, rules, and recipes for action. 2
Further, "all these institutions, organizations, and social values
tend to cohere with each other, although they vary in the degree to
which they are tightly coupled with each other into a full-fledged
system.",3 Accordingly, this new theoretical paradigm tended to
stress the likely limits to change in national SSPs.4 There was
particular skepticism about convergence on Anglo-American
(especially U.S.) systems centered on markets for standardized
goods as primary coordinating mechanisms. Initial restatements
acknowledged the limits of this paradigm to explain why such
configurations occur within a particular place and time, but they
were more ambitious in contending that no particular new
configuration would emerge even amidst globalization. 5
Subsequent research along these lines developed even more
ambitious frameworks of analysis to distinguish Anglo-American
systems, incorporating a broader array of empirical data. One
influential reformulation proposed by Herbert Kitschelt and others
adapts David Soskice's distinction between "liberal market
economies" (LMEs) and "coordinated market economies"
(CMEs).6 This turns on whether businesses coordinate their
interactions primarily with spot-market contracts, as opposed to
"mechanisms of generalized exchange or resource pooling and
hierarchical coordination among firms and business associations"
allowing employers to produce collective goods.' Kitschelt and
others acknowledge that considerable differentiation exists among
CMEs, but they are most concerned with those European
economies primarily coordinated at the national level (notably in
Scandinavia) versus the sectoral or industrial level ("Rhine"
2 J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer, Coordination of Economic Actors and
Social Systems of Production, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF
INSTITUTIONS 1, 2 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997) [hereinafter
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Robert Boyer & J. Rogers Hollingsworth, From National Embeddedness to
Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM, supra note 2.
6 Herbert Kitschelt et al., Convergence and Divergence in Advanced Capitalist
Countries, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 427, 429
(Herbert Kitschelt et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter CONTINUITY AND CHANGE].
7 Id.
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capitalist countries such as Germany or Belgium).8 Both sub-
groups differ from "the Anglo-Saxon world of competitive market
capitalism where employers are rarely able to produce collective
goods through horizontal or vertical coordination," a distinction
seemingly more important than "mixed cases" such as France and
Italy, lying "between LMEs and industry-coordinated CMEs." 9
Kitschelt and others also follow Soskice in acknowledging a
further possible sub-group of CMEs, involving "coordination
among groups of companies across industries in Japan and Korea
(group coordinated market economies)."' However, they pay
only limited attention to these countries in their subsequent
analysis, and Japan appears as a curious hybrid in later attempts to
correlate types of capitalism with political organization, welfare
statism, unemployment, and growth rates.'" Data for Japan does
reveal a decline in economic performance since the 1970s,
implying that it, too, is being subjected to the major
transformations categorizing the other types of capitalist
economies analyzed by Kitschelt and others.' 2 However, they are
not persuaded by the neo-liberal argument of convergence towards
minimal political control in allocating resources (or non-market
coordination). 3  Instead, they suggest that: (1) nationally
coordinated CMEs have moved quite decisively in that direction
since the 1980s, but still retain significantly more political control
than most sectorally coordinated CMEs; (2) the latter have not
moved significantly in that direction, and indeed may exhibit now
8 Id.
9 Id. at 429 n.3. See also Martin Rhodes & Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Capital
Unbound? The Transformation of European Corporate Governance, 5 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y No. 3, 406, 408-11 (1998). Rhodes and Apeldoorn highlight key differences
between "Germanic" and "Latin" economies, characterized as "network-oriented" in
terms of institutional context and corporate features (arguably corresponding to CMEs),
in contrast to "market-oriented Anglo-Saxon" economies (LMEs). By contrast, the
former distinctions are glossed over in Peter Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to
Varieties of Capitalism (paper presented to the EUI Seminar on "Economy as Polity:
European Theoretical and Historical Perspectives," October 26, 2000, Florence (revised
as an opening chapter in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001))).
10 Kitschelt et al., supra note 6, at 429 n.3.
I I Id. at 434 tbl. 15.1, 435 tbl. 15.2, 436 tbl. 15.3.
12 Id. at 436 tbl.15.3.
13 Id. at 434-44.
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more variety in solutions along this overall parameter; and (3) so
do LMEs nowadays, despite notable decreases overall in political
control over economic allocation of resources. 4 Reincorporating
Japan into this picture as a hybrid implies skepticism about the
possibility that it may be moving rapidly towards a LME model.
This accords with the earlier express analysis of Japanese
developments by Hollingsworth, based on joint research
underpinned by the SSP paradigm; 5 and a more recent analysis of
the historical roots of capitalist organization in both Germany and
Japan. 16
Another political scientist, Linda Weiss, broadly follows these
lines of argument. She contends that many major economies other
than Britain and the United States have strong states with actual
(or potential) "transformative capacity" for advancing socio-
economic welfare, which will survive the onslaught of market
forces worldwide. 7 Most prominent examples given are from
East Asia, especially Japan, where "governed interdependence"
between government and business has arguably developed the
richest variety of forms.' 8 Generally, she concludes that "nation-
states will matter more rather than less," advancing rather than
retarding the development of the world economy, due to "(1) state
adaptation rather than decline of functions, (2) strong states as
'midwives' not victims of internationalization, and (3) the
emergence of 'catalytic states' [like Japan] consolidating national
and regional networks of trade and investment."'1 9
Importantly, however, all these studies are based primarily on
research dating back to the mid-1990s. Subsequently, Japan's
14 Id. at 444 fig.15.2.
15 J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of
Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States, in CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE, supra note 6. Cf. Hollingsworth & Boyer, supra note 2, at 3.
16 Gregory Jackson, The Origins of Non-Liberal Corporate Governance in
Germany and Japan (June 10-11, 1999) (paper presented at the European University
Institute (EUI) conference, "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Europe
and Japan"), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALLY ORGANIZED CAPITALISM IN
GERMANY AND JAPAN (Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura eds., forthcoming)).
17 See generally LINDA WEISS, THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE 41-89 (Peter J.
Katzenstein ed., Cornell University Press 1998).
18 See generally id. at 69-79.
19 Id. at 195-96.
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full-blown banking crisis in 1997 has been followed by
accelerating deregulation and restructuring in financial markets,
calling into question the "Japanese model," while the Asian
financial crisis has prompted more positive reappraisals of market-
driven methods of capitalist organization.2 ° Weiss had observed
that "a resurgent Japan is not an unlikely outcome of the quiet
restructuring and institutional consolidation of the early- to mid-
1990s, '2 I but so far there has been little evidence of this. Instead,
"regulatory forbearance" (a polite term used by two economists) 22
has characterized Japan's banking crisis, contributing to an
enormous fiscal cost as well as probably being largely responsible
for the stagnation of the Japanese real economy throughout the
1990s. 23  The stream of bad economic news from Japan,
mentioned in the opening quote and showing few signs of
abating,24 further undermines the view of contemporary Japan as a
rather exemplary strong state with extensive transformative
capacity.
More recently, Weiss has reiterated that: (1) Japan had
experienced some growth during Japan's so-called "lost decade"
over the 1990s; (2) the Asian crisis may have undermined an
incipient recovery; (3) the policy response of Japan's policy-
makers, waiting for asset values to increase, may therefore have
been rational and certainly appears no better or worse than
responses, for instance, to the U.S. savings and loan debacle a
decade ago; (4) Japan still retains transformative capacity in the
form of links among business and key state actors, including the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI, as it was known), which
has developed new industrial policy frameworks every decade
(recently focusing on information and telecommunications
20 See id. at 155.
21 Id.
22 Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990's:
Sources and Lessons, IMF WORKING PAPER WP/00/7, 26 (Jan. 2000), at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubind.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
23 Id.
24 Murphy, supra note 1, at 2. See, e.g., Record 3.57 Million Without a Job,
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 2001, at http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/
200110/30/2001lO3Op2aOOmObuO15001c.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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infrastructure); and (5) deregulation was initiated by the Ministry
of Finance to encourage Japan's financial sector also to "catch
up."'25 However, most commentators stress instead the poorly
thought out nature of financial markets deregulation beginning
before Japan's big bang, the large scope of its bad loans problem,
the likely massive contraction in the size of Japan's banking sector
as even more firms move to capital markets financing, and the
relatively obvious likelihood of the present banking crisis, yet
Japanese policy-makers' comparatively slow response.26
On the other hand, there is probably some truth in the
following general conclusion from Weiss:
The Japanese model has been sorely tested by recession, low
growth and the bank crisis. But in the long run, it may be
misguided to hail every change as another nail in the coffin of
Japanese capitalism. Indeed, far from Americanizing Japanese
capitalism, financial reforms may end up reinvigorating it via
27
creative adaptations of existing institutions.
25 See Linda Weiss, Developmental States in Transition: Adapting, Dismantling,
Innovating, Not 'Normalizing,' 13 PAC. REV. No. 1, at 21, 25 (2000). Since a
reorganization of central government in effect since January 6, 2001, MITI has become
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). METI provides a list of its e-
commerce initiatives on its web site. METI, E-Commerce and E-Government Special
Features, at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/special/E-Commerce/index.html (last visited
Dec. 28, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
26 See, e.g., TAKEO HOSHI & ANIL KASHYAP, THE JAPANESE BANKING CRISIS:
WHERE DID IT COME FROM AND How WILL IT END? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W7250, 1999) (arguing that the deregulation leading up to the Big
Bang has played a major role in the current banking problems), available at http://
papers.nber.org/papers/W7250 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation). As one Japanese financial newspaper put it recently,
"The nearly unanimous view among experts is that Japan will have to undergo radical
surgery to overcome its current crisis, which is not limited to the field of finance, and
should be prepared to shed considerable blood." Toyo Keizai, International Financial
Community Gives Japan a Thumbs Down [Kokusai Kin 'yukai Mo Mihanasu Nippon No
Kiki], JAPAN ECON. UPDATE (Jan. 20, 2001), at http://www.japanecho.co.jp/jeu/
arch/010121.html#tl (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). One should also not forget Japan's "mini-crisis" with bad
housing loans, prior to its full-blown banking crisis in 1997. This was another large
financial debacle characterized by moral hazard, regulatory failure, and sharp conflict.
Curtis Milhaupt & Geoffrey Miller, Co-operation, Conflict and Convergence in
Japanese Finance: Evidence from the 'Jusen' Problem, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1
(1997).
27 Weiss, supra note 25, at 48-49. See also Masafumi Nakahigashi, Corporate
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Certainly, we must go beyond breathless reports of radical
change emerging from some quarters of the financial press over
recent years.28 The bewildering variety of conclusions reached by
other commentators within Japan and abroad, especially in the
United States,29 must also be scrutinized. Key parameters should
be identified and quantified to determine whether the
transformations in contemporary Japan imply a significant and
rapid convergence on Anglo-American forms of capitalist
organization. Corporate governance in Japan can offer a central
focus in this exercise, because it can be broadly defined to cover
most aspects potentially relevant to this determination in a
coherent fashion, incorporating readily available recent data. Just
as existing institutions may require what Weiss terms "creative
adaptations, ''3° so does the construction and application of theory
in relation to Japan.
This article therefore begins by arguing that problems of
operating corporate bodies can be usefully conceptualized in terms
of express or implied "agency" contracts among various
stakeholders, especially managers and owner/shareholders, but
also creditors, employees, suppliers or contractual partners outside
the firm or other owners, and even local residents or government
authorities (a type of "social contract").3 This view does not
Governance in Japan in the 21st Century: A Comment on Nottage, in THE MULTIPLE
WORLDS OF JAPANESE LAW: DISJUNCTIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS 98 (Tom Ginsburg, Luke
Nottage & Hiroo Sono eds., 2001), available at http://www.capi.uvic.ca/
publications.html#con.
28 See Ronald Dore, The Corporate Governance Debate in Japan (June 10-11,
1999) (paper presented at the EUI conference, "The Political Economy of Corporate
Governance in Europe and Japan"), revised and reprinted in RONALD DORE,
STOCKMARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM: JAPAN AND GERMANY VERSUS THE
ANGLO SAXONS 71 (2000). See also Martin Rhodes & Richard Higgott, Introduction:
Asian Crises and the Myth of Capitalist Convergence, 13 PAC. REV. No. 1, at 1 (2000).
29 Simon Reich, Miraculous or Mired? Contrasting Japanese and American
Perspectives on Japan's Economic Problems, 13 PAC. REV. No. 1, at 163 (2000).
30 Weiss, supra note 17, at 196-97.
31 See, e.g., W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL (1991) (discussing other expansive views of corporate
governance); ROBERT BALLON & KEIKICHI HONDA, STAKE HOLDING: THE JAPANESE
BOTTOM LINE (2000). However, broad definitions of corporate governance may risk
analytical looseness. Kotaro Tsuru, Japanese Corporate Governance in Transition (Aug.
2000) (rewritten version of paper presented at the EUI conference, "The Political
Economy of Corporate Governance in Europe and Japan," June 10-11, 1999), at http://
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necessarily entail, as proponents of neo-classical "law and
economics" tend to believe, 32 that all such "contracts" should be
freed of any mandatory elements.33 But the approach is useful
because it focuses on common problems underlying all these
stakeholder relationships. As Takeo Hoshi points out, providing a
major organizing framework for this article, a major problem is
incomplete information.34 If all shared full information, for
instance, shareholders or creditors would not have to worry about
managers wasting their money. Yet in the real world, incomplete
information gives rise to the dual problems of "adverse selection"
("hidden information," resulting for example in creditors agreeing
to lend money to what turn out to be generally high-risk firms) and
"moral hazard" ("hidden action," such as managers investing
loaned funds into excessively high risk projects).35  These
difficulties are compounded by others: the inability to write
contracts for the stakeholder relationships which expressly provide
for all possible contingencies, because of the difficulty of
foreseeing future scenarios, and the inability to perfectly enforce
those contracts.36 These definitions of "adverse selection" and
"moral hazard" applied by Hoshi to analyze corporate governance
may not accord precisely with their usage initially in the context of
insurance markets, but they do highlight underlying problems of
opportunism and bounded rationality. 37 They can be usefully
developed to uncover and structure empirical data concerning
econ.snu.ac.kr/~ecores/activity/00sympo/Kotaro.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Cf John Cioffi, State of the
Art, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 (2000) (review essay). Readers may judge for themselves
the usefulness of the expansive approach adopted in the present article.
32 E.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
33 See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
34 Takeo Hoshi, Japanese Corporate Governance System, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 847 (Klaus
Hopt et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
35 Id.
36 Enforcement problems have often been highlighted in Japan. Indeed, there are
strong statistical correlations between areas where problems exist and activities of
criminal organizations. See Curtis Milhaupt & Mark West, The Dark Side of Private
Ordering, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 41 (1997).
37 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).
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relations involving managers and shareholders,38 creditors of the
firm, 39 and employees.4 ° The overall picture is one of significant
rapprochement of manager and shareholder interests; severe
challenges to post-war bank-financing measures; but less obvious,
and perhaps only long term, pressures reshaping employment
relations.
Yet raw opportunism may not be the only force at work.4'
Seemingly robust patterns of cooperative relations have developed
among firms in some industrial sectors, especially in the
automobile industry. They have been most notable in post-war
Japan, but they have also found root in the United States.42 The
attraction of the model underlying these patterns, entrenching trust
through radically open information gathering and sharing among
expanding groups of participants, may encourage the emergence
of novel forms of corporate governance, even if the overall trend
in Japan nowadays is towards more arm's length relations.43
Arguably, a key determinant will be whether similar processes of
"learning by monitoring" take root also at the level of the Japanese
state, another key stakeholder in corporate governance. Adding
this contingency further clouds a final assessment of whether
Japan will converge on neo-liberal models. But such refinements
add new perspectives to the ongoing debate on "varieties of
capitalism."" In particular, by uncovering possibly conflicting
tendencies at different levels of socio-economic and political
ordering, they take us beyond views of pervasive transformations
and blanket convergence, on the one hand, or little change or
persistent differences, on the other.
II. Shareholders as Primary Stakeholders
The agency problem between shareholders and managers
38 See infra Part II.
39 See infra Part Ill.
40 See infra Part IV.
41 See infra Part V.
42 Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge while
Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE No. 3, at 443 (2000), available
at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ICCpragcoll.pdf.
43 See infra Parts lI-IV.
44 See infra Parts V-VI.
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usually remains the most important aspect of corporate
governance, at least for large publicly held companies. 45  To
counter the informational advantage held by managers, two types
of systems are available to shareholders. The first is "control
oriented." That is, the shareholders monitor management behavior,
often delegating this to a Board of Directors whom they elect; and
they intervene if necessary, for example by a proxy vote fight to
replace Directors and hence managers. However, the costs
involved in this system usually make it more attractive to large
shareholders with good management skills themselves. A second
system available to shareholders, "arm's length" control, is more
passive. The shareholders do not actively intervene in
management. However, they take action when unsatisfied with
managers, especially by selling shares, which may lower share
prices and encourage hostile takeovers. Employee Share
Ownership Programs (ESOPs) can also facilitate such indirect
control, by turning employees into another type of stakeholder-
shareholders. Another way to motivate managers to work for
shareholders is to create common interests, for instance through
high-powered incentive methods such as very profit-sensitive
bonuses or stock options.46
For most of the post-war period in Japan, "arm's length"
control has been weak; but this began to change over the 1990s.47
On the one hand, stock option schemes were legalized in mid-
1997. By January 1999, 165 companies (96 listed) had introduced
them, 48 including some of Japan's largest companies as well as
45 There are about 9,000 such companies in Japan. See generally Hideki Kanda,
Comparative Corporate Governance Country Report: Japan, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34 (presenting useful background information
about Japanese corporate structure). About 6,330 companies have a capital base
sufficient for listing on Japan's main stock exchanges. See Takashiro Yasui, Corporate
Governance in Japan (Mar. 3-5, 1999) (paper presented at the OECD conference,
"Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective"), at http://www.oecd.org/
pdf/M000015000/M00015752.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
46 See Hoshi, supra note 34, at 851-52; cf Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of
the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 42-64 (2000) (describing a range of other
possible conceptions for shareholders' relations with managers).
47 See Hoshi, supra note 34, at 849, 851-52.
48 Yasui, supra note 45, at 16.
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new start-ups (notably in Internet or family-care businesses).49 In
turn, this may begin to affect a longstanding reluctance to
remunerate executives of Japanese corporations as highly as their
counterparts overseas.5 ° Further, bonuses in Japan have been
linked to profits generated-in fact, more so (ironically) than
dividends paid to shareholders-but not linked closely enough to
generate in itself what Hoshi calls a "high powered" incentive for
managers to work in shareholders' interests.5 However, even the
bigger firms nowadays, despite their tradition of "life-time
employment" with promotion based primarily on seniority, are
beginning to introduce performance-related wage differentials.52
These transformations in labor relations may also reactivate
ESOPs as an incentive for good management. So far in Japan,
although ESOPs have been adopted by a large majority of listed
companies and collectively amount to significant percentage
shareholdings, they have neither encouraged more dividend
payouts nor acted as a mechanism to independently control
management.53 Instead, reliance has been placed on "career
concems"-tying reputation to company performance.54 This is
now undermined by economic stagnation.
On the other hand, other types of arm's length control have
long operated in Japan, albeit not always so obviously; and they
too are becoming increasingly important. Commentators have
long stressed the lack of hostile takeovers in post-war Japan, due
in large part to the development of extensive cross-shareholdings
among firms. The precise historical roots of this tendency remain
unclear, although most accounts point to stock market weaknesses
soon after World War II, when companies needed capital and the
threat of takeovers was high. Ironically, cross-shareholding also
49 Introduction of Stock Options in Major Firms, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 9
(Sept. 1, 2000) (listing examples of corporations offering managerial stock option plans),
at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vo39-09/03.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
50 Yasui, supra note 45, at 6.
51 Hoshi, supra note 34, at 852.
52 See infra Part IV.
53 See Masaru Hayakawa, Shareholders in Japan: Attitudes, Conduct, Legal Rights,
and Their Enforcement, in JAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM 237, 243-44
(Harald Baum ed., 1997).
54 Tsuru, supra note 31, at 5.
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may have emerged because Japanese corporate law, influenced by
U.S. law, further extended substantive rights to shareholders,
though many of those rights have remained mandatory.55 Japanese
managers therefore may have encouraged the development of
cross-shareholding as an alternative way to protect their interests.56
Managers in the United States and elsewhere have been able to
invoke other techniques more recently, through tailoring their
corporate constitutions, such as creating "poison pills" whereby a
debenture or the like must be issued if an investor purchases more
than a set percentage of shares, or arrangements to limit voting
rights to a minority percentage even if the investor obtains more
than that percentage of shares.
Whatever the historical origins of the comparative lack of
hostile takeovers in post-war Japan, the normative force of this
phenomenon has been shaken by recent developments, in the
shadow of surging merger activity and tender offers over the
1990s. 51 On January 24, 2000, for example, Shoei Corporation
was subjected to a hostile bid from a Japanese firm called M&A
Consulting (MAC), led by a former senior official at MITI and
financed by Orix Corporation, a large leasing and financial
services provider.5 8 Although it only obtained 6.5% of the target,
in which cross-shareholders controlled two-thirds of outstanding
stocks, MAC went on to propose two shareholders' resolutions
and secure proxy votes at Shoei Corporation's annual general
meeting on March 28, 2000, garnering thirty percent support. 5
9
55 Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 210-11 (2000).
56 See Eiji Takahashi, Changes in the Japanese Enterprise Groups?, in JAPAN:
ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM 227, 229-33 (Harald Baum ed., 1997).
57 See CURTIS MILHAUPT & MARK WEST, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND M&A IN
JAPAN: DIVERSITY THROUGH DEALS 34-36 (Mich. L. and Econ. Res. Paper No. 01-
010/Col. L. and Econ. Working Paper No. 193, Nov. 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.coml
paper.tafabstractid=290744, reprinted in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (Curtis
Milhaupt ed., forthcoming).
58 Curtis Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Non Legal Rules
in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2112-14 (2001)
(analyzing the history and evolution of norms that have influenced Japanese corporate
governance).
59 See also M&A Consulting, Inc., Changing Market in Japan: Shareholder Value
in Becoming the Japanese Standard, at http://www.maconsulting.co.jp/achiev.htm (last
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The emergence of such nonconformist "norm entrepreneurs" is
partly a reflection of the changes in Japan over the 1990s. But
they build on some less obvious arm's length control mechanisms
that remained operative throughout the post-World War II
period.60 So-called "friendly" takeovers or mergers often occurred
in the context of poor performance, reflected in weak share prices.
Importantly, from the perspective of shareholder/management
agency theory, there is strong correlation between share price
weakness and resignations of managers.6' While those taking over
firms in hostile bids do not replace managers, the managers retire
"voluntarily." Shishido provides one important causal explanation
for this pattern: Japanese firms who perform badly on the share
market find it difficult to raise equity finance, and that makes it
more difficult to obtain debt finance from banks.62 That pressure
will be greater in recessionary times, as it is in Japan nowadays.
Conversely, he notes some recent evidence that pressures from the
Japanese share market already are forcing some firms to
restructure their labor relations, and then signaling satisfaction
with that management response in the form of higher share
prices.63  Overall, moreover, aggregate cross-shareholding in
publicly traded shares has declined since the stock market collapse
and the burst of Japan's "bubble" economy in the early 19 9 0 s.6
Indeed the pace seems to be accelerating: cross-shareholding ratios
of around 21% from 1986 to 1995 (money base) declined to 16%
in 1998.65 More declines can be expected. Indeed, there were
reports of Japanese corporations winding down cross-
shareholdings vigorously in the first quarter of 2000 to improve
visited Dec. 28, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation) (reporting other recent aggressive activities of this
entrepreneur).
60 See Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with Their
Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 403
(1996).
61 Id. at 409-17; Tsuru, supra note 31, at 6.
62 Shishido, supra note 55, at 216.
63 Id. at 216 n.122.
64 Id. at 233-34.
65 Id. at 232 tbl.6. Data from other sources shows a decline in cross-shareholdings
(by value) from 16-18% from 1987-1996 to 15.03% in 1997, 13.22% in 1998, and
10.53% in 1999. See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 57, at 38-39 tbl.3.
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their balance sheets before the end of the fiscal year, taking
advantage of a brief revival of the Japanese stock market in
1999.66
What life has remained in the stock market over the 1990s has
been due in large measure to investment from abroad.67
Particularly noticeable in recent years is more interest from
foreign institutional investors, such as pension and investment
funds, whose growing presence in Japan was noted already in the
mid-1990s. 68  Although nowadays driven in part by the much
bigger boom in the U.S. share market, another key development
has been the deregulation of financial markets in Japan in recent
years.69 While these institutional investors may become less
prominent in Japan if there is a major downturn in the United
States, they surely will remain a significant new feature of
Japanese financial markets. As in other countries,7 ° they should
continue to inject more arm's length control into the corporate
governance system in Japan.71
One related indication of this is more attention among
managers towards efficient use of capital and return on equity.
Many companies have provided for share buybacks following
amendments to the Commercial Code in 1995 and especially in
1998, although fewer have actually carried out repurchases,72 and
66 U.S. Embassy Tokyo, 2000 Investment Climate Statement for Japan (Aug. 3,
2000). Unwinding of cross-shareholdings is also mentioned in U.S. Embassy Tokyo,
2001 Investment Climate Statement for Japan (July 18, 2001), http://www.mac.doc.gov/
japan/source/menu/investment/jcs01.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
67 By the end of the decade, foreigners held about 10% of listed shares, and 12% of
listed Japanese companies have 15% or more foreign ownership. See Yasui, supra note
45, at 14.
68 Hayakawa, supra note 53, at 243.
69 See infra Part III.
70 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Folklore of Investor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1970 (1997) (reviewing MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY
MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1996)).
71 See Mitsuhiro Fukao, Japanese Financial Instability and Weaknesses in
Corporate Governance Structure (March 3-5, 1999) (paper presented at the OECD
conference, "Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective"), at
http://www.oecd.org/pdfJM000015000/M00015809.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
72 Yasui, supra note 45, at 16.
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Dore questions whether greater attention from managers to these
indices reflects more promotion of shareholder interests or simply
faddism. 73 Another aspect is relaxations in December 1997 on the
creation of holding companies, seen by Shishido 74 as a possible
answer to a set of key problems in Japanese conglomerates so far:
accountability and determination of profit centers. 7' These may
also be addressed by recent amendments to facilitate corporate
reorganizations.76
Significant changes in accounting rules for listed companies
underpin such developments, expanding possibilities for arm's
length control.77 These have been prompted in part by massive
discrepancies in reported financial statements for failed financial
institutions, as well as mistrust of internal auditing procedures
after a series of well-publicized problems involving corporate
racketeers.78 Consolidated disclosure of contingent liabilities, such
as guarantees (common in Japanese corporate finance), took effect
in April 1998. 7' The scope of subsidiaries and affiliates, which
had to be included in accounts, was expanded the following year.
From April 2000, all marketable financial assets held for trading
purposes had to be recorded at market price rather than book
value; and market value accounting also for cross-shareholdings
73 DORE, supra note 28, at 71.
74 Shishido, supra note 55, at 223-24.
75 Yasui supra note 45, at 18.
76 See generally Masafumi Nakahigashi, Kigyo Saihen Hosei no Hensen to Kongo
no Kadai [Changes in Corporate Reorganization and Future Issues], 35/1-2 CHUKYO
HOGAKU [CHUKYO L. REV.] 25 (2000).
77 See, e.g., Toyo Keizai, Dawning of the New Accounting Age, JAPAN ECON.
UPDATE (Apr. 22, 2000), http://www.japanecho.co.jp/jeu/arch/000422.html#t3 (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation);
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Topics, http://www.jicpa.or.jp/
n-eng/e-newsflash.html (last visited December 28, 2001). Cf. Bernhard Grossfeld,
Global Accounting: Where Internet meets Geography, 48 AM. J. COMp. L. 261 (2000)
(commenting on the centrality of the relationship between accounting rules and corporate
governance). There are also major pressures towards convergence created by securities
law reforms worldwide, arguably more significant than changes to corporate law rules.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641
(1999).
78 Yasui, supra note 45, at 13.
79 Id. at 17 n.18.
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and long-term securities holdings was required from April 200108
From April 2000, or (optionally) 2001, listed companies also had
to disclose unfunded pension liabilities by valuing pension assets
and liabilities at market price.8' This already has highlighted
further difficulties in some of Japan's largest firms, 82 and all these
changes make evaluation of shareholdings more transparent and
objective.
In parallel, potentially important developments have started to
transform "control-oriented" shareholder mechanisms. The "main
bank" system has been central in this regard for most of the post
World War II period. It involved a bank-usually with the largest
shareholding, albeit limited under the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)
to five percent or less-sending its own managers to direct
operations of debtor companies performing too badly.83  The
system is coming under pressure also due to the recession,
particularly as it has affected Japanese financial institutions,
combined with deregulation of the financial sector.
84
By contrast, smaller or less powerful shareholders in Japanese
companies have faced a major obstacle in exercising more direct
control over managers: the emasculation of the board of directors,
due to the tradition of appointing directors from among managers,
usually resulting in very large boards. 85 This too has been related
to patterns of life-long employment in (at least top-tier) Japanese
companies. Combined with keiretsu and other links within groups
of companies, this tradition also has tended to make the
80 Id. at 17 n.19.
81 U.S. Embassy Tokyo, 2001 Investment Climate Statement for Japan, para. 16
(July 18, 2001), http://mac.doc.gov/japan/source/menu/investment/jcs0l.html (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
82 See, e.g., Toyo Keizai, What Will Ghosn Do About Nissan's 400 Billion Yen
Pension Debt?, JAPAN ECON. UPDATE (Apr. 22, 2000), http://www.japanecho.co.jp/jeu/
arch/000422.html#t4 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
83 See discussion infra Part III.
84 See discussion infra Part 11.
85 Yasui, supra note 45, at 4-5. As of July 1998, the average number of directors
at listed companies was about twenty; in addition, forty-nine companies had forty
directors or more. Id. at 5.
86 In a typically provocative paper, Miwa and Ramseyer contend that main-bank or
horizontal keiretsu are no more than a myth concocted first by Marxist economists in
Japan in the 1960s. YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU
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"statutory auditor" scheme largely ineffective in monitoring
management.
87
This cozy system is now challenged by more appointments of
outside directors. Boards are also being downsized to promote
more effective decision making. An early example was Sony,
always an innovator, and now with particularly high foreign
ownership.8 8  But of the two-thirds of listed companies that
responded to a survey in September 1998, thirty percent had
appointed outside directors and reduced the size of the board.8 9 By
May 1999, about half of the seventeen major banks had introduced
executive officers (instead of directors) and downsized their
boards. 90  Lateral pressure has come from the Corporate
Governance Forum, established in 1994 by a former president of
the Industrial Bank of Japan (now merged into the Mizuho group)
and now co-led by Orix Corporation chairman, Yoshihiko
1 (John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series No. 316, Mar. 2001) (paper presented at the
University of Michigan conference, "Change, Continuity, and Context: Japanese Law in
the Twenty-first Century," Apr. 6-7, 2001), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olincenter/papers/pdf/316.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation), reprinted in 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming).
However, while presenting some econometric data suggesting that financial links
cementing firms in such corporate groupings are not significant, they do not count
personnel relations and exchanges among group firms, seen as important by other
commentators on keiretsu. This point was made by Professor Yoichi Hamada following
their conference presentation, and is now picked up by Curtis Milhaupt. CURTIS
MILHAUPT, ON THE (FLEETING) EXISTENCE OF THE MAIN BANK SYSTEM AND OTHER
JAPANESE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS (Col. L. and Econ. Working Paper No. 1949, Nov.
2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=290283, reprinted in 27 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming). Milhaupt also presents several other compelling criticisms
of the analysis, and over-exaggerations, contained in the paper by Miwa and Ramseyer.
87 Yasui, supra note 45, at 5-6.
88 RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM: JAPAN AND
GERMANY VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS 104, 116-19 (2000); Sumio Sano, Corporate
Governance at Sony: Innovations in the Board of Directors 4-5 (Apr. 4, 2001) (paper
presented at the third OECD Asian Roundtable to Discuss Corporate Governance),
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00009000/M00009075.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
89 Tokyo Stock Exchange, TSE Efforts to Encourage Thorough Corporate
Governance by Listed Companies in Japan 3 (May 2000) (paper presented at the second
OECD Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, May 3 1-June 2, 2000, Hong Kong),
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M000015000/M00015766.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
90 Yasui, supra note 45, at 20.
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Miyauchi. The Forum published Principles of Corporate
Governance in 1998,91 calling for corporate governance rules
reforms similar to those espoused by the OECD and the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CALPers). Also important
are direct pressures from institutional investors, especially from
those based abroad like CALPers. Further, as foreign direct
investment in Japanese companies grows,92 outside directors
should become more common. So far the most salient examples
of outside appointments to the boards of Japanese companies have
been from large foreign investors in very weak companies. 93
These have mainly been as managing directors, rather than non-
executive directors theoretically better able to monitor for
shareholder interests. Yet, as outsiders, this tendency disrupts the
traditional board structure in Japanese corporate governance.
Even some insiders are becoming less predictable, with a number
of prominent presidents having reached their position through
career paths outside the mainstream within their companies,
including lengthy periods abroad.94 They have taken initiatives in
91 MICHAEL GIBSON, 'BIG BANG' DEREGULATION AND JAPANESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF THE ISSUES 14 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 624, Sept. 1998), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/1998/624/ifdp624.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
92 Ludwig Bonacker, Unternehmenskauf in Japan, 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER
JAPANISCHES RECHT 114 (1999), available at http://www.djjv.org/japrecht/heft8/
vortraege/bonacker.html; Luke Nottage, Investing in Japan Today, 49 Asiawatch (CCH)
16 (2001).
93 One example is Renault in Nissan. See Nissan's Restructuring Plan and the
Union's Response, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 1 (Jan. 1, 2000), http://www.jil.go.jp/
bulletin/year/2000/vol39-01/03.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation); Putting Nissan Back on Track, 27 JAPAN
ECHO, No. 2, 36, 36-40 (Apr. 2000) (interview by Kishi Nobuhito with Carlos Ghosn,
COO, Nissan Motors Co.), available at http://www.japanecho.co.jp/docs/html/
270211 .html. Another example is DaimlerChrysler in scandal-stricken Mitsubishi
Motors. See Luke Nottage, New Concerns and Challenges for Product Safety in Japan,
11 AUSTL. PRODUCT LIABILITY REP. No. 8, 101, 101-11 (2000), http://www.iue.it/LAWI
res/nottage/aplrproofs.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation). See also Merging Japan, OECD OBSERVER (Feb. 24,
2000) (discussing cross-border mergers and acquisitions, particularly those involving
Japanese automotive companies), http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/
198 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
94 See Tsuru, supra note 31, at 15.
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increasing truly independent statutory auditors, promoting
disclosure, and so on. All these developments help explain why a
Study Group sponsored by MITI, regulating and supporting most
areas of industry in Japan, has proposed significant reforms to
Japanese corporate law by 2002, including more outside directors
and other measures to separate management from monitors of
corporate activities.95
Involving outside directors, and heightened attention generally
to shareholder rights in the 1990s, 96 are trends related to a
strengthening of the ability of all shareholders-including
minority shareholders-to enforce their rights. Especially in
shareholder derivative litigation, the key seems to have been a
legislative amendment in 1993 which set filing fees at a uniform
8,200 yen (less than U.S. $100). There were only 84 derivative
action cases pending in Japanese district and high courts in 1993;
but this jumped to 133 in 1994 and to 158 in 1995. 97 In 1997,
there were 219 derivative suits pending before district and high
95 One of the largest pension funds in the world, CALPers, increased significantly
its investments outside the United States in the mid-1990s, calling for improvements in
corporate governance in countries like Japan in which it increased exposure. CALPERS,
Corporate Governance Facts (Dec. 2001), at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/about/factglan/
corpgov/corpgov.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). It has since teamed up with the large UK fund, Hermes
(http://www.hermes.co.uk), to advance such causes. However, appointing outside
directors is not only a foreign concern. "According to a survey by [Japan's] Life
Insurance Association, 42 percent of companies and 84 percent of institutional investors
[in Japan] suggested that outside directors would stimulate the debate, add new
perspectives, and strengthen monitoring." Nicholas Benes, Finally, Corporate Japan
Begins to Shift into Reform Gear, ASIAN WALL STREET J., Jan. 8-14, 2001, at 16. More
generally, Japanese institutional investors recently "were urged by the Employee's
Pension Fund Association, the effective leader of [Japan's] corporate pension sector, to
exercise [voting rights at shareholders' meetings] to the advantage of pensioners," when
U.S. consulting firm Institutional Shareholders Services entered the Japanese market in
April 2001 aiming to show them how to best do so. Japanese Shareholders to be
Schooled in How to Exercise Voting Rights, NIKKEI WKLY., Feb. 12, 2001, at 12.
96 Toshimitsu Kitagawa & Luke Nottage, Globalization of Japanese Corporations
and the Development of Corporate Legal Departments: Problems and Prospects (Dec.
11-14, 1998) (paper presented at the Harvard Law School conference, "The Emergence
of an Indigenous Legal Profession in the Pacific Basin").
97 MARK D. WEST, WHY SHAREHOLDERS SUE: THE EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN 9 tbl. I
(John M. Olin Center for Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 00-0010, 2000),
http://papers.ssrn.com (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
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courts,98 and 286 pending by the end of 1999.99 By 1998, half of
listed companies had taken out insurance covering directors
against certain claims.'00  This procedural change thus has
significantly reinforced the comparatively strong substantive rights
of shareholders under Japanese law. 10' Further, in late 2000 the
Osaka District Court awarded a record 83 billion yen in damages
against eleven former directors of Daiwa Bank, in a shareholders'
suit based on poor supervision resulting in illegal bond trading by
the bank's New York office. 10 2  The collapse of the Sogo
department store chain resulted in another massive claim against
its founding president in 2001; and on March 12, a lawyer
belonging to the "Kabunushi Ombudsman" watchdog group filed
suit against eleven former and current directors of Mitsubishi
Motors Corporation for 1.17 billion yen, demanding they take
responsibility for 1.5 billion yen in lost vehicle sales resulting
from concealing defect claims.'0 3 These events have prompted
business interests to call for amendments to the Commercial Code
to restrict liability exposure of managers, although strong
opposition has been voiced.' °4 By expanding the capacity of all
shareholders to directly or indirectly control managers, burgeoning
shareholder derivative litigation makes it more difficult for key
shareholders (such as main banks) to act in their own interests (or
for creditors generally) to the detriment of shareholders overall.'0 5
Thus, "control-oriented" supervision of managers by main banks
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 DORE, supra note 88, at 96.
101 Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in
Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Reforms, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 9, 10, 18-21 (1997).
102 Milhaupt, supra note 58, at 2115.
103 Shareholders Group Sues MMC Over Cover-Up, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Mar.
13, 2001, at http://www]2.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/837117/MMC-04.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
104 Id. Cf. Government Plans Damages Limit for Company Bigwigs, MAINICHI
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 24, 2001, at http://wwwl2.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/
839445/daiwa-0-1 .html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). On the background to the reform discussion, see West, supra
note 97, at 10 n.20.
105 Yasui, supra note 45, at 10.
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is further displaced by actual or potential supervision through
shareholders more generally.
III. Creditors, Recession, and Financial Market Deregulation
A distinctive feature of post-war corporate governance in
Japan has been the greater importance of creditors as stakeholders,
due to comparatively more use of bank finances as opposed to
equity finance. Yet this characteristic has been fading over the last
two decades, as companies accumulated retained earnings and
gradual financial markets deregulation permitted them to more
readily raise funds through bond issues and the like. °6 Already in
mid-1997, before the banking crisis, a survey of managers found
that sixty percent expected the role of main banks to decline.1
0 7
The relative importance of capital markets in corporate finance
will undoubtedly expand in importance in the wake of ongoing
economic stagnation and Japan's current severe credit crunch,
combined with globalization and broader financial market
deregulation. The latter program was initiated at the end of 1996
and accelerated in 1998, because of concerns about poor return on
capital by Japanese financial institutions throughout the post
World War I period, and especially about a rapid loss of global
competitiveness in the 1990s.' °8 This "Big Bang" (or "Long
Bang"!) is now virtually complete, and the legislative and
structural reforms are very wide-ranging. 109
106 See generally TAKEO HOSHI ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCING AND GOVERNANCE IN
JAPAN (2001).
107 Yasui, supra note 45, at 12.
108 See generally James Malcolm, Making Sense of the Japanese "Big Bang," I
ICCLP REV., Sept. 1998, at 47 (reviewing the translation of the "Big Bang" from
proposal to policy), available at http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/-icclp/Reviewl-2.pdf.
109 Ministry of Finance, Schedule for Financial System Reform (Apr. 2000), at
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb33.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). See also Eric C. Sibbitt, A
Brave New World for M & A of Financial Institutions in Japan, 19 U. PENN. J. INT'L &
ECON. L. 965, 1025 (1998); Hideki Kanda, New Aspects of Japanese Financial
Regulation (Nov. 4-5, 1999) (paper presented at the fourth Sho Sato Conference, "Legal
Reform and Social Change in Japan") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation). See also Kenjiro Egarashi,
Transformation of the Financial System and the Corporate Law of Japan (Aug. 12, 1999)
(paper presented at the University of Melbourne conference, "Legal Crisis in Japan and
Asia"); Malcolm, supra note 108, at 48.
[Vol. 27
JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As mentioned in Part I,1l0 like other stakeholder relationships,
the relationship between creditors and managers gives rise to
problems of adverse selection (leading to credit going too readily
to risky firms) and of moral hazard (monitoring problems allowing
poor projects by management). Blame for the abrupt decline in
the Japanese financial sector over the 1990s lies in part with the
Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of Finance (the
Bank of Japan having become a more independent policy maker
only relatively recently). Yet Japanese financial institutions were
also responsible for their own plight, having embarked on a huge
spending spree in the late 1980s, which has led to reports of
massive bad debts in recent years."' Generally, this disaster stems
from distortions in evaluating and pricing risk." 2 Specifically, it
relates to problems in corporate governance, which encouraged
financial institutions in Japan to lend (and invest) in risky firms,
and then not adequately monitor managers in those firms.l 3
One solution for these tensions between creditors and
managers is to give creditors shares in the companies to which
they lend. This helps to the extent that shareholders generally can
overcome agency problems vis A vis managers." 4  In addition,
creditors can attempt to control managers in two main ways. One,
again, is more arm's length control. The creditor still delegates
much control to managers, but may step in to force bankruptcy,
thus creating an incentive for managers to pursue creditors'
interests.' ' However, forcing bankruptcy must be a credible
option, and Japanese insolvency law has had various problems,
which only began to be addressed seriously towards the end of the
110 See supra Part I.
IH1 Beate Reszat, Finanzkrize in Japan [Financial Crises in Japan], 8 ZEITSCHRIFr
FUER JAPANISCHES RECHT 106 (1999), available at http://www.djjv.org/japrecht/heft8/
vortraege/reszat.html.
112 See The 21st Century Public Policy Institute, A Prescription for Normalizing the
Function of the Financial System (June 30, 1999), at http://www.21ppi.org/english/
policy/19990630/summary2.htmI (on file. with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
113 See generally PAUL DICKIE, STRENGTHENING EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS:
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 10 (Asian Studies Institute Working Paper, Victoria
University of Wellington, 1999); Kanaya & Woo, supra note 22, at 22.
114 See supra Part II.
115 Hoshi, supra note 34, at 853.
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1990s." 6 One result has been enactment of a more functional
corporate reorganization regime in 1999, generating 392
proceedings within the first six months of coming into force on
April 1, 2001.17
Alternatively, or in addition, creditors can adopt more control-
oriented strategies. They can monitor more directly the behavior
of managers, and intervene if necessary in their appointment or
replacement. One way in which Japanese banks have been able to
directly monitor their lenders' managers, at least within Japan, has
been by providing a range of services (such as general business
advice or match-making) rather than just loans.118 Yet that was
difficult in overseas lending; and difficulties were encountered
domestically as Japanese companies themselves became more
sophisticated and competition intensified as a result of accelerating
financial markets deregulation.'19 The latter, combined with the
recessionary environment facing Japanese financial institutions in
particular, also makes it more difficult to retain the long-term
relationship required of a firm's main bank. 12  A key aspect of the
main bank's role was to act as a primary lender, which also held
shares over lengthy periods, and intervened especially in times of
the debtor's financial distress by seconding bank managers. 121 As
banks become strapped for funds, however, they may call in their
loans or simply refuse to lend more; an increase in lender liability
claims by debtors was noted in the mid-1990s. 122 More recently,
other cases have been reported in which main banks did not save
companies by providing loans, while in other instances they did
116 See generally Kent Anderson, The Cross Border Insolvency Paradigm: A
Defense of the Modified Universal Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21
U. PENN. J. INT'L & ECON. L. 679, 700-24 (2000) (using Japan as a case-study in dealing
with cross-border insolvencies).
117 Andreas Kaiser, New Japanese Bankruptcy to Rehabilitate Indebted Business,
LEGAPRACTICE (Jan. 2001), at http://www.legamedia.net/legapractice/kaiserandreas/
2001/01-01/0101_kaiserandreas-bankruptcy.php (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
118 Yasui, supra note 45, at 10.
119 Id. at 12.
120 Id. at 12-13.
121 Id. at 9.
122 Curtis Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance:
Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 49-55 (1996).
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not bear a disproportionate burden of losses following liquidation.
A related phenomenon is a belated "flight to quality" in lending,
perversely exacerbating the present credit crunch. Finally, there is
evidence of banks selling off their shareholdings, reportedly after
client firms offloaded their stocks in banks, and in the shadow of
dangerous declines in the ratio of market over book value (4:1 in
1986, but only just over 1:1 in 1998).123 Unwinding shareholdings
prevents financial institutions from remaining or developing into a
main bank, but does allow them to monitor debtor firms, and
creates less incentive to send their own managers to debtor firms if
in distress (especially as even the big banks have enough problems
of their own nowadays). Reputation as a main bank can unravel
quickly, and it is difficult to regain. 12 4
Such breakdowns have become even more likely as more
foreign financial institutions have taken advantage of deregulation
to enter the Japanese market since the late 1990s.' 25 These
outsiders are particularly likely not to take over-and certainly not
take on--even small shareholdings in debtor firms in such a
volatile environment. Even if they do, they may refuse to "take
turns," accepting instead the delegation of other
creditors/shareholders to send valuable management resources to
help keep debtor firms alive. Their inclination, no doubt often in
their short-term interest, may be to enforce their strict legal rights
by calling in their security or forcing bankruptcy. After all,
lending institutions and associations in Japan have long made sure
that their strict rights are well protected by standard general terms
and conditions for banking transactions.126
Three other factors now undermine the main bank system.
The first arises from the nationalization and re-privatization of the
failed Long-Term Credit Bank.1 27 The government sold it to a
group of foreign investors, including Citigroup, giving a "put
option" to return any assets (loans) that decline from book value
123 Fukao, supra note 71, at 6-8.
124 Tsuru, supra note 31, at 8.
125 See generally Sibbitt, supra note 109.
126 See Masabumi Yamane, Financial Transactions in Japanese Law, in JAPANESE
BANKING, SECURITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 21, 23-29 (Hiroshi Oda & R. Geoffrey
Grice eds., 1994).
127 Milhaupt, supra note 58, at 2110-11.
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(as of March 1, 2000) by twenty percent or more within three
years. 28 But this is lost if the bank accepts a borrower's request
for loan forgiveness. In mid-2000, the re-privatized bank refused
to forgive debts owed by Sogo Department Store, forcing it into
bankruptcy, going against what has been expected of a main
bank. 29  More generally, bank failures undercut an implicit
guarantee against the one given by the Japanese government, in
exchange for strong institutions supporting weak ones through the
main bank system.13° Finally, the Asian financial crisis and
Japan's long recession are perceived to have caused a significant
shift in beliefs about the benefits of bank-oriented corporate
finance and governance. 131
Theoretically, there is some possibility of Japanese financial
institutions instead starting to accumulate larger shareholdings in
debtor firms, hence positioning themselves for more control-
oriented monitoring of debtor firms. This could follow from an
amendment to Article 11 of the AML, as clarified by Japan Fair
Trade Commission Guidelines, whereby a financial institution can
hold more than five percent of shares issued by a company, if the
latter's business was subordinated to the former's, "at least 50
percent, in principle." Previously, this was allowed only if the
latter's business was subordinate to the former's, "at least 90
percent, in principle."' 132 As more and more firms are permitted to
add financial services to their operations, this route may lead to
banks being able to take greater shareholdings in them. Yet this
option still does not remain open for investments in companies
whose main business is not related to financial services, even in
the new broad sense. In addition, as the economic recession and
problems in the financial sector persist, it seems unlikely that
financial institutions in Japan will want to try to invest broadly
like this. Rather, we can expect more sell-offs in the small
shareholdings held so far, and consequent ongoing decline in the
main bank system as a key corporate governance mechanism in
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See generally Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 26.
131 Milhaupt, supra note 58, at 2110-11.
132 Cf Sibbitt, supra note 109.
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Japan, although it may remain important for smaller firms. 133
Domestic institutional investors, whose buffers of unrealized
gains in land and shares have also been sharply eroded, will find it
difficult to take up this slack, at least on the basis of implicitly
assuming disproportionate risks through such buffers. This
reinforces pressures to (1) allow defined contribution pension
plans in order to attract foreign investment,' 34 (2) restore faith in
investment trust management in order to encourage more
individual investment on the Japanese share market, (3) improve
disclosure and accountancy rules in order to promote further
investment from abroad, and (4) further encourage share
buybacks. '35
IV. Employees and the Vicissitudes of the Labor Market
Another often cited aspect of Japanese corporate governance,
especially into the 1980s, is the strong influence of employees.136
The conventional wisdom has been that Japanese corporate
governance was profoundly influenced by the orientation of
companies first towards "people" (i.e., employees), then
"products" (i.e., technically excellent goods), and then "profits"
(for shareholders). 37  This is contrasted with the German model
(fixated first on products, then people, and then profits), and
especially the Anglo-American model (first profits, then products,
133 Cf. Carla Koen, The Japanese "Main Bank" Model: Evidence of the Pressures
for Change (June 23-24, 2000) (paper presented at the first annual Conference of the
Research Network on Corporate Governance), at http://www.wz-berlin.de/wb/
cogonetpdf/koen.en.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
134 Broader based reform of the state pension scheme also seems important, since
this underscored the shift in corporate governance in the United States and dampened
changes in Germany. Cf Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization,
570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153 (2000).
135 See generally Fukao, supra note 71.
136 See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, The Economics of Corporate Governance in Japan, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34; Ryuichi Yamakawa, The
Silence of Stockholders: Japanese Labor Law from the Viewpoint of Corporate
Governance, 38 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. I I (Nov. 1, 1999), at http://www.jil.go.jp/
bulletin/year/1999/vo138-11/04.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
137 See Yamakawa, supra note 136.
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people last!). 138  The importance of employees in Japanese
companies, at least "regular" employees in larger ones, has
admittedly been strong. 139 Yet this factor can also be analyzed in
terms of agency problems, and how their stakeholding in
companies relates to that of other stakeholders. That analysis,
together with observed tendencies in the labor market and
important legislative amendments, points to further growing
pressures on Japanese corporate governance.140
Usually, discussions of relations between employees and
managers center on the latter as "principals," attempting to hire the
former as "agents," despite the possibility of adverse selection,
and attempting to monitor their delegated activities, despite moral
hazard ("shirking," due again to imperfect information in the
138 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Corporate Governance in East Asia and Western Europe:
Competition, Confrontation and Co-Operation, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 85, 96-99 (OECD ed. 1997). Cf Toshiaski Tachibanaki, Surviving the
Recession Without Slashing Payrolls, 26 JAPAN ECHO No. 5, at 51 (Oct. 1999), at
http://www.japanecho.co.jp/docs/html/260517.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
139 See Tachibanaki, supra note 138.
140 Similarly, Fukao predicts the following realignment in various stakeholders'
proportional claims to company assets:
(1) Creditors > Core Employees > Top Executives > Shareholders (but only
realized profits that could be used as dividends) > Other Employees; to
(2) Creditors > Smaller Group of Core Employees > Top Executives >
Shareholders (all profits, including unrealized profits) > Other Employees.
Fukao, supra note 71, at 21, 23.
By contrast, John Haley insisted recently that Japan will not change its
fundamentally "communitarian" orientation without change in what he sees as the most
distinctive and central institutional feature of post-war Japan: "entry level hiring coupled
with a central personnel office staffed by senior career manager[s] with full
responsibility for the recruitment, training, assignment and promotion of career staff'.
See John 0. Haley, Japanese Law in Transition n. 19 (Apr. 6-7, 2000) (paper presented at
the University of Michigan conference, "Change, Continuity, Context: Japanese Law in
the Twenty-first Century"). As leading U.S. commercial law professor James White
pointed out in oral response to Haley's paper, this pattern has been pervasive among
large companies in the United States (e.g., TWA and GM). Even more compellingly,
Masako Kamiya responded that the pattern seen as central by Haley is irrelevant to the
large majority of Japanese firms and employees (many still with only high school
education). More generally, Haley's paper did not provide any empirical data on labor
market changes or perceptions, or legislative changes, as presented in Part IV of this
article.
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relationship). 41 This can simply be reversed to analyze
implications for corporate governance. The problem then
becomes how employees, as principals, constrain managers, as
agents who may prefer to fritter away company funds on
themselves. Again, one solution is to give employees shares in the
company (through ESOPs and the like), but this will only restrict
managers to the extent that agency problems between shareholders
and managers are resolved generally. 42 Otherwise, the only
realistic alternative is more control-oriented measures. One
example is the two-tier board structure for German stock
companies, in which a supervisory board is partly elected by
employees, and then appoints management board members. 143
Japanese corporate law provides no such formal mechanism for
employee supervision of managers. Yet control arises in practice
especially because most managers in large Japanese companies
have been appointed from among existing employees, in a system
of life-long employment and promotion based primarily on
seniority. Correspondingly, the external labor market has not
grown much in recent decades.
Again, the origins of such institutions are unclear. Like
several supposedly distinctive features of Japanese law (such as a
limited number of practicing lawyers),' 44 the practice of lifelong
employment seems to have taken root only quite recently.1
45
Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe observe that:
[F]rom World War I through the end of World War II, worker
mobility in external labor markets eroded labor stability when
labor was tight, and employers' willingness to fire even senior
workers eroded labor stability when labor markets were not
tight. Employers tried but failed to build wage and seniority
141 Yamakawa, supra note 136.
142 See supra Part II.
143 See generally Mark Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities
Markets, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199 (1999).
144 Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in MIRROR
OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS OF MODERN JAPAN 48, 60-61 (Stephen Vlastos
ed., 1998); John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPAN. STUDIES 359,
385 (1978).
145 Cf. Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law:
Activism in the Service of Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 651 (1996); Jackson, supra
note 16.
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structures to induce workers to stay during labor shortages.
Government intervention reduced but failed to stop turnover. 
46
Gilson and Roe argue that lifetime employment practices arose
in the even more unlikely economic environment shortly after
World War II, characterized by extreme labor surplus, because of
exceptional political events.147  Rapid unionization and radical
worker activism (strikes and plant takeovers) prompted
conservative reactions and a "deal" establishing a privileged
segment of labor (mainly surviving employees) accorded lifetime
employment. 48  Thereafter, "Japan's economic problem was to
craft associated institutions that could function effectively given
the politically imposed lifetime employment," including
restrictions in external labor markets. 149 Yet nowadays Japan faces
a very different political as well as economic environment, with
record unemployment (and further "under-employment"), and
institutional changes opening up the possibility again of increasing
worker mobility through external labor markets. Gilson and Roe
also identify several significant "stress points" in the post-war
Japanese system.5 ° For instance, it does not cope well during
times of dramatic technological change, 5' and "competition"
among lifelong employees for promotion in an internal labor
market will not work effectively when firms no longer are
growing.
Rather similarly, Zenichi Shishido points out that labor
turnover rates in the 1920s and 1930s were almost the same as
those in the United States but the latter jumped in the 1940s and
146 Ronald Gilson & Mark Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 520 (1999).
147 Id. at 520-24.
148 Id. at 521-24.
149 Id. at 524.
150 Id. at 537-40.
151 Id. at 538. This may be particularly problematic in view of significant
developments in information technology in the late 1990s, after an admittedly slow start
at least compared to the United States. Cf generally Luke Nottage, Cyberspace and the
Future of Law, Legal Education and Practice, WEB J. OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (1998),
at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue5/nottage5.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation) (an updated version of this
article will be available in TRANSNATIONAL CYBERSPACE LAW (Graham Greenleaf &
Makoto Ibusuki eds., forthcoming)).
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have remained much higher ever since. 152  He argues that the
transformation in the United States was linked to the Great
Depression, and that if the Japanese recession continues there will
be an irreversible decline in lifetime employment as a key aspect
sustaining the post-war corporate governance system in Japan. 153
More generally, ongoing recession creates a zero-sum situation
and heightens conflicts between employees and other stakeholders,
notably shareholders. 154  The latter will no longer tolerate
employees being treated as de facto residual claimants, for
instance earning wage hikes or salary bonuses while dividends
remain constant or decline. 155  Shishido also identifies a parallel
strengthening of the external labor market and the corporate
control (share-)market. 15 6
Labor law scholars such as Ryuichi Yamakawa, perhaps due to
reliance on more historical data, are more impressed by the
enduring quality of the post-war model, but note a number of
major challenges to this model. 157  One is precisely the broader
political economy environment. 5 8 The recession plus deregulation
152 Shishido, supra note 55, at 222.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 216.
155 Id. at 215. Hitherto uniform and almost ritualized, in Spring 2000 collective
wage bargaining was distinguished by no major wage increases, even in the largest
firms. 2000 Spring Offensive: Signs of Change, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 6 (2000), at
http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vo139-06/02.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Further:
A Ministry of Labour survey suggests it is likely that the average pay hike in
percentage terms will be around two percent, lower than the previous record
low of 2.21 percent last year. Many labor leaders believe that the outcome of
this year's wage talks reflects an on-going shift in the priority which
management is now giving to shareholders at the expense of employees, a
situation they view with alarm.
Id. The merger of new industry-based unions, and the creation of some totally new ones,
may also be important in that respect. See, e.g., Reshuffling of Industry-Based Unions,
39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 1 (2000), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-
01/04.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation); cf generally Mari Sako, What is the Boundary of the Firm for Enterprise
Unions in Japan? (June 10-11, 1999) (paper presented at the EUI Conference, "The
Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Europe and Japan").
156 Shishido, supra note 55, at 217.
157 Yamakawa, supra note 136.
158 Id.
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creates more variability in corporate profitability, a key factor as
the credit crunch still facing Japanese financial institutions further
encourages companies to turn to stock and bond markets-often
global, and more demanding of good corporate/managerial
performance. In addition, the service sector continues to grow in
importance, bringing the need for (and the possibility of) more
flexible working hours.15 9 Both factors are related to changing
demographics in the labor force generally, characterized by more
elderly people, women, and part-time workers. 60 This also affects
the resilience of lifelong employment as a core concept in the
Japanese corporate world. Yamakawa still concludes that it will
remain, albeit with some modifications.1 6' In particular, he relies
on a 1999 survey of the Japanese Institute of Labor in which
33.8% of respondents (690 companies out of 2370 employing
1000 or more people) declared that they intended to maintain the
life-long employment system; 44.8% said it had to be partially
modified; and 17.1% said it needed radical reexamination. 1
62
Fujikazu Suzuki suggests that "some persistence of the long-
term employment practice" is indicated by a survey conducted in
February 1999, by the Research Institute for the Advancement of
Living Standards, a think tank funded by the Japanese Trade
Union Confederation (Rengo). 63 Senior managers from 731 out of
1307 companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange mostly thought that it was "not probable" over the next
five years that "employees with short length of service become
ordinary even in the core members" (59.4%); only 11.56% thought
it "probable," with 27.1% unable to guess and 0.8% reporting it
159 Cf. Tadashi Hanami, Japan, in NON-STANDARD WORK AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 209 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 1999).
160 Katsutoshi Kezuka, Legal Problems Concerning Part-Time Work in Japan, 39
JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 9 (2000), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-
09/06.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
161 Ryuichi Yamakawa, Labor and Law Reform in Japan: A Response to Recent
Socio-Economic Changes, Presentation at the Fourth Sho Sato Conference, "Legal
Reform and Social Change in Japan," 3 (Nov. 4-5, 1999) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
162 Id.
163 Fujikazu Suzuki, How the Top Managers See the Japanese Corporation (June
10-11, 1999) (paper presented at the EUI Conference, "The Political Economy of
Corporate Governance in Europe and Japan").
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"happening now."' 64 However, a similar majority (56.6%) thought
it probable that promotion would come to be based on
performance rather than seniority, a trend also acknowledged by
Yamakawa.165 The Rengo survey also shows that most managers
tended to expect significant changes in manager attention to
Return on Shareholder Equity and management monitoring
mechanisms.
66
Further pressures on the lifelong employment system are
provided by a survey by a Labor Ministry working group in
January 2000.167 It found that only 9.5% of 591 respondent firms
continued attaching importance to life long employment, while
38.3% did not and 51% did so only on a limited basis. 68
However, a problem with all these surveys is that they question
incumbents within firms. To get a better picture of the future of
this central aspect of Japan's employment and corporate
governance systems, more research should be conducted into what
young people want nowadays. Certainly it seems that they are
disillusioned with the fact that present employment patterns in
Japan are strongly biased towards the incumbent, older generation,
especially those in lifelong employment. 1
69
Finally, Yamakawa reviewed the major changes recently made
to an array of labor legislation. 70  These should prompt-or at
least cement in place-broader transformations in the labor market
in Japan. 171 The main changes can be summarized as follows:172
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 More Japanese Firms See Life Employment Unnecessary: Survey, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR, Nov. 20, 2000, 2000 WL 30239779.
169 See generally Yuji Genda, Youth Employment and Parasite Singles, 39 JAPAN
LAB. L. BULL. No. 3 (1999) (arguing that the younger generation's relatively high
unemployment is more the result of a shrinking demand for labor than due to a perceived
generational lack of work ethic and drive), at http://www.jil.go.jp./bulletin/year/2000/
vo139-03/05.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
170 Yamakawa, supra note 161, at 1-2, 5-14.
171 This assumes that formal legal rules do matter in Japan. By contrast, Anna
Maria Konsta concludes to the contrary, focusing on labor law generally and working
time regulation in particular. Anna Maria Konsta, Working Time Law in Japan and the
European Union: A Comparative Approach in the Context of Legal Culture (2000)
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* 1998 amendments to the Labor Standards Law: allowing
longer-term labor contracts, requiring written clarifications
of work conditions upon hire and reasons for termination
(a growing source of tension),'73 and divorcing overtime
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute, Florence), at
http://biblio.iue.it/search/akonsta/1,6,7,B/frameset&F=aknosta+anna+maria&l,1 (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). This
runs directly contrary to the analyses of Daniel Foote, a well-known commentator in this
and other areas of Japanese labor law. See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, Law as an Agent of
Change? Governmental Efforts to Reduce Working Hours in Japan, in JAPAN:
ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM 251 (Harald Baum ed., 1997); Daniel H. Foote,
Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and Judicial Activism in Japan, 25 LAW IN
JAPAN 19 (1995). The notion that law does not matter in Japan is also gainsaid by
sociologically informed studies of product liability, contracting, and commercial
arbitration. See, e.g., Luke Nottage, The Present and Future of Product Liability Dispute
Resolution in Japan, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 215 (2000)); Luke Nottage, Economic
Dislocation and Contract Renegotiation in New Zealand and Japan: A Preliminary
Empirical Study, 27 VICT. U. L. REV. 59 (1997); Luke Nottage, Planning and
Renegotiating Long-Term Contracts in New Zealand and Japan: An Interim Report on
an Empirical Research Project, N.Z. L. REV. 482 (1997); Luke Nottage, The Vicissitudes
of Transnational Commercial Arbitration and the Lex Mercatoria: A View from the
Periphery, 16 ARB. INT'L No. 1, at 53 (2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation). Even the mainstream media appears to
have abandoned the strongly "culturalist" explanation of Japanese law which guides
Konsta's thesis. Tim Larimer, Targeting Japan Inc., TIME ASIA, Sept. 25, 2000,
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0925/japan.consumers.html (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
172 Luke Nottage, Japan, in Doing Business in Asia (CCH) paras. JPN T 60-003 ff.
173 Since coming into effect in October 1998, a scheme involving informal and
formal conciliation by Ministry of Labor officials in individual employment disputes has
been used increasingly, with dismissals being the major category of dispute. These
processes rely on voluntary settlement brokered by government officials, but labor
interests now propose that the Labor Relations Commission be allowed to rule on the full
range of individual labor disputes. See, e.g., The Dispute Resolution Support System, 39
JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 10 (2000), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-
10/05.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation). Underpinning this development is an escalating number of disputes brought
before District Courts. The annual number of lawsuits concerning individual labor
disputes has tripled over the last decade, exceeding 2000 cases in 2001. See Trends in
the Number of Lawsuits Involving Labor Disputes 1989-2000, 40 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL.
No. 6 (2001), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2001/vol40-O6/07.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Cf
generally, Nottage, supra note 172, para. JPN 160-011.
Meanwhile, amendments to Japan's unemployment benefit scheme (in effect from
April 2001) have reduced payouts to those in their early sixties, and increased those to
younger workers. See, e.g., Revision of the Employment Insurance Law, 39 JAPAN LAB.
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payments from hours worked (indicating more stress on
quality of work);
* 1997 amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law: 74 now prohibiting discrimination in recruitment,
assignment, and promotion, as well as in dismissal and
retirement, compelling employers to mediation if requested
by employees, and addressing problems of sexual
harassment (still a frequent source of litigation, since the
early 1990s);'75
* 1995 amendments (in effect from April 1999) to the Child
Care Law: extending leave to provide care to elderly
family members;
176
* 1999 amendments to the Working Dispatching Law:
abolishing the "positive list" system of limiting dispatching
to specified (professional) job categories, in favor of a
"negative list" system, and putting pressure on companies
L. BULL. No. 7 (2000), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vo139-07/05.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
174 Cf. Tadashi Hanami, Equal Employment Revisited, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No.
1 (1999) (noting that the 1997 Amendment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law
introduced for the first time official endorsement of positive anti-discrimination
measures by employers and regulations dealing with sexual harassment), at
http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin /year/2000/vo139-01/05.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
175 Indeed, the first case of sexual harassment of a male has recently attracted public
attention. See, e.g., Fukuoka Man Settles Sexual Harassment Case with Male Boss,
JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 2001, 2001 WL 9082331. More generally, on the
responses to heightened awareness of this issue due to litigation and legislative
amendments, see Sexual Harassment: Actual Inquiries and the Responses of Companies,
39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 7 (2000), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-
07/02.htm#l (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation); and Nottage, supra note 172, para. JPN T 60-004. See also
warnings published by the Ministry of Labor in June 2000. Matters for Special Attention
in Hiring Employees by Status, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 9 (2000), at
http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vo139-09/05.htm#l (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
176 Further amendments, to be submitted to the Diet in 2001 to take effect beginning
April 2002, will extend the availability of flex-time work schedules, shorter working
hours or exemptions from overtime work, to care for children until they turn three (rather
than one). See Mainichi Shimbun, Work and Family, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Dec. 29,
2000, http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200012/29/20001229p2aOOmOoa098000c.
html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
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using such temporary helpers to offer them employment
first if the company decides to hire for work done by the
temporary helpers (potentially creating a new hybrid
category of employees); 177
Simultaneous amendments to the Employment Security
Law: also changing to a "negative list" system for private
placement of non-temporary workers, clearer licensing for
businesses doing this, and replacement of a blanket fee
maximum chargeable (which hampered attempts to head-
hunt and place managers); 178
177 See generally Takashi Araki, 1999 Revisions of Employment Security Law and
Worker Dispatching Law, 38 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 9 (1999) (noting that the 1999
revisions of the Working Dispatch Law has drastically relaxed regulations of worker
dispatching businesses by simplifying administrative procedures while at the same time
strengthening dispatch worker protection), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/1999/
vo138-09/06.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
178 See generally id. (noting that the revision of the Employment Security Law of
1947 has lifted the general prohibition on private fee-charging placement businesses and
has placed private placement services as a coexisting player with public placement
services engaging in the supply-and-demand adjustment of the Japanese labor market).
Further:
According to the Ministry of Labor, from December 1, 1999 (when the laws
came into effect) to June 1, 2000, 293 enterprises offered fee-charging job
placement services (an increase of 34 percent compared to the same period in
the previous year) and 898 enterprises were dispatching employees to other
firms (an increase of 23 percent). As of June 1, 2000, the number of private
fee-charging job placement businesses totaled 3,930, an increase of 8.1 percent
from the end of November 1999 .... According to the Special Survey of the
Labor Force Survey conducted in February [2000] by the Management and
Coordination Agency, only 2.8 percent of unemployed people rely on private
job placement agencies when looking for work. That compares with 40.1
percent who rely on Public Employment Security Offices. On the other hand,
some 900,000 workers were dispatched in fiscal 1998, 4.7 percent more than the
previous year. Thus, although the private sector still plays a minor role in the
market, as employment patterns become more varied in the future, rapid
expansion of private job placement firms is expected. Moreover, since workers
can now be dispatched to any category of job, it is almost certain that their
numbers and significance will increase in the near future.
Participation in Private Employment Placement Services Increases, 39 JAPAN LAB. L.
BULL. No. 9 (2000), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vo139-09/02.htm#1 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
See, e.g., 2000 Economic Survey of Japan: A New Era Begins, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL.
No. 10 (2000) (noting that the number of employees in managerial posts has fallen while
dispatched workers are in increasing demand), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/
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* 1999 enactment of a Fundamental Law for a Gender-Equal
Society (which may encourage affirmative action
programs, etc.);179
* Moves to promote pension plans based on "defined
contributions" pension, rather than just "defined benefits"
(which had discouraged voluntary job-switching, because
complete vesting was unusual); 180 and
* Draft legislation announced in mid-2001 to promote
reemployment, prompted by record levels of
unemployment. 181
In addition to recent changes in the legal environment, long-
standing transformations in the political economy are broadly
related to globalization. 8 2 Globalization is also beginning to have
a more direct effect on the Japanese labor market. In the boom
times of the 1980s, many "guest workers" were brought in for
blue-collar work, which the Japanese were unwilling to touch.
Many have stayed on, often illegally. Yet a significant feature of
vo139-10/01.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
179 Nottage, supra note 172, para. JPN 60-034. Cf Fundamental Law for a
Gender-Equal Society, 38 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 9 (1999) (noting that the
Fundamental Law for a Gender-Equal Society obliges the government to establish a
basic plan for a gender-equal society and a procedure for handling complaints
concerning its measures), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/1999/vo138-09/05.htm#l
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation); White Paper on Gender Inequality, 39 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 8 (2000)
(noting that this paper is the first report promulgated under the mandate put forth by the
Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2000/vol39-
08/01.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
180 Japan Econ. Newswire, Cabinet OKs Bill for New Defined-Benefit Pension
Plans, Feb. 20, 2001. Although the proposed reforms only address hybrid schemes, even
the largest Japanese companies have already begun voluntarily recrafting their pension
schemes to allow more transportability. In 1999, for instance, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Company allowed the option of taking "retirement benefits in twice-yearly
increments while still on the job, rather than in a lump sum at retirement .... More than
40% of new hires have chosen the incremental payments, four times the number
Matsushita expected." Yumiko Ono & Bill Spindle, Japan's Decline Makes One Thing
Rise: Individualism Soured on Consensus, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2001, at 1.
181 Draft of Law to Facilitate Reemployment, 40 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 5 (May 1,
2001), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2001/vol40-O5/04.htm#l (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
182 See supra notes 147-69 and accompanying text.
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the 1990s was a slowly growing presence of white-collar
employees and managers from abroad, even at the senior executive
level. 83 This is most noticeable in the financial sector, but it is
tied to broader patterns in foreign direct investment, especially
mergers and acquisitions involving companies from abroad.'84
While it is too early to say what independent effect these
developments will have on the labor market in Japan, cumulatively
they reinforce the changes impacting the future of corporate
governance in Japan.'85
V. Conflicting Tendencies in Industrial Production and the
State
Applying principal-agent theory to analyze three key aspects
of Japanese corporate governance suggests that the interests of
managers and shareholders have drawn closer together and that
severe challenges have emerged for corporate finance centered on
main banks. However, pressures reshaping employment relations
may be less obvious and may consolidate only over the long term.
Overall, these transformations amount to more convergence on the
arm's length relations characteristic of Anglo-American corporate
governance. Further complicating the picture, however, the notion
of opportunism underlying principal-agent theory may not be the
only force at work. This becomes apparent when further
stakeholders in the firm are brought into view.
Another important set of stakeholders, affecting the relations
among the others described so far, consists of the firm's outside
suppliers and customers. Particularly intriguing are the
cooperative relations which have developed among firms,
183 Non-Japanese Employees in Japan: Report of the Ministry of Labour, 40 JAPAN
LAB. L. BULL. No. 3 (Mar. 1, 2001), at http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2001/vol40-
03/03.htm#l (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
184 See, e.g., Bonacker, supra note 92. See also Sibbitt, supra note 109.
185 By the end of 1998, despite the recession, the number of registered foreign
workers had increased a further 2% to reach a record high. Registered Foreigners
Exceed 1.5 Million, 38 JAPAN LAB. L. BULL. No. 9 (Sept. 1, 2001), at
http://www.jil.go.jp./bulletin/year/1999/vo138-09/02.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). See also Gregory Clark, Why
is Japan Turning to Foreigners for Help?, 27 JAPAN ECHO No. 2 at 41 (2000), available
at http://www.japanecho.co.jp/docs/html/270212.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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especially in the automobile industry, notably in post-war Japan
but later finding root in the United States. Recent studies of
industrial organizations have focused on "learning by monitoring"
in the automobile industry (and some others), involving: (1)
benchmarking (exacting surveys of current, and likely future,
products and processes) to uncover new general processes; (2)
simultaneous engineering (where subunits responsible for
components undertake similar benchmarking, while considering
implications for other subunits, which may lead to redefining the
project as a whole); and (3) systems of strict error detection and
correction for the new routines, with further extensive information
sharing to respond quickly before consequences become
disastrous. 86  The emergence of this paradigm suggests that
pervasive patterns of information sharing may entrench norms of
cooperation, seen not just as a means of securing individual
benefits but rather as ends in themselves, underpinned by a vision
of "enlarging the pie" rather than trying to obtain a larger slice at
the others' expense. History also shows how dramatic changes in
conditions may unravel such collaborative relations (as in the U.S.
automobile industry over the 1960s and 1970s) but then builds
them up again as underlying mechanisms become apparent (as in
the 1980s and 1990s).187
Little comprehensive data is readily available on what has
happened to relations among firms in Japan's automobile industry,
especially in the late 1990s, 188 when the changes to other aspects
of corporate governance appeared to find more traction. Despite
some notable developments, 8 9 the economic and sociologic
186 Helper et al., supra note 42, at 445-46.
187 Id. at 475-76.
188 Historical data is not presented, for example, in Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark
Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: Subcontracting in the Japahese
Automobile Industry, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2636 (2000).
. 189 Japanese automobile makers contracted with 1,245 companies in 1994,
compared to 298 in 1987, and bought $15.5 billion in parts from the United States in
1993, six times more than in 1986. See Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani,
Corporate Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds,
3 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 848 (2000). See also Mitsuo Ishida, Japan: Beyond the
Model for Lean Production, in AFTER LEAN PRODUCTION: EVOLVING EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES IN THE WORLD AUTO INDUSTRY 45 (Thomas A. Kochan et al. eds., 1997); see
discussion supra note 93 (broader restructuring in the wake of Renault's investment in
Nissan). Parts are increasingly procured from operations around the world, and almost
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underpinnings of cooperative inter-firm relations may prove
resistant in this industry. It is demonstrably more successful, and
still holds reserves to draw on, compared for instance to Japan's
weak financial sector. Further, Noboru Kashiwagi reports that
although Japan's auto manufacturers are now using e-commerce to
unwind keiretsu or preferential relationships with suppliers for
standardized products, they are retaining such relationships for
more technologically complex parts.190 Relative stasis in such an
important production chain would present a tension with the trends
towards change identified above,"' even if the latter relations
(within the firm) are more constitutive of corporate governance.
But a similar tension arguably characterized the United States over
the 1980s and 1990s, as contracting among firms (at least in some
manufacturing and services sectors) became based more on
information sharing and learning by monitoring, yet arm's length
control and market-based coordination increasingly characterized
corporate governance in its narrower sense.'92
The entrenchment of learning by monitoring mechanisms in
the United States at the level of industrial production, and their
possible resilience in Japan, 93 may encourage the emergence of
all Japanese automobile manufacturers have seen significant foreign investment since
1996. See, e.g., METI, at http://www.meti.go.jp/english.
190 Noboru Kashiwagi, I Can't Turn You Loose: The Termination of Distributors
and Agents in Japan at Parts 2 and 3.b.v. (Apr. 6-7, 2001) (paper presented at the
University of Michigan Conference, "Change, Continuity, Context: Japanese Law in the
Twenty-First Century"). See also Scott E. Masten, Reaffirming Relationship-Specific
Investments: Comments on Miwa and Ramseyer's 'Rethinking Relationship-Specific
Investments,' 98 MICH. L. REV. 2668, 2674 (2000).
191 Kashiwagi, supra note 190.
192 Charles F. Sabel, Design Deliberation and Democracy: On the New Pragmatism
of Firms and Public Institutions (Dec. 15-16, 1995) (paper presented at the EUI
Conference, "Liberal Institutions, Economic Constitutional Rights, and the Role of
Organizations") at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.html (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Charles
F. Sabel, Ungoverned Production: An American View of the Novel Universalism of
Japanese Production Methods and their Awkward Fit with Current Forms of Corporate
Governance (Feb. 16, 1996) (paper presented at the Institute of Fiscal and Monetary
Policy Conference, "Socio-economic Systems for the 21st Century"), at http://www.law.
columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Japan.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
193 For an interesting experiment in a different sector, see IBM Japan Knits Parts
Suppliers into Chain: On-Site Storage of Modules Cuts Response Time, Costs, NIKKEI
WKLY, Feb. 12, 2001, at 10. See generally Helper et al., supra note 42, at 479-80.
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novel forms of corporate governance in both countries. They
might include "corporate incubators" for strategic thinking
established within firms, performance metrics based on baskets of
measures subjected to continuous review and redefinition, and
venture capitalists. However, these applications are less well
established than in industrial production, and are thought to run
more risk of being displaced by more straightforward market-
based corporate governance mechanisms.
19 4
On the other hand, similar processes of learning may also
support novel forms of corporate governance by monitoring at the
level of the state-a further, broader stakeholder in corporate
organization. An important parallel trend in advanced
industrialized democracies appears to be "democratic
experimentalism," 195 involving: (1) central authorities which
"create a framework for experimentation by defining broad
problems, setting provisional standards, pooling measurements of
local performance, aiding poor performers to correct their
problems, and revising standards and overall goals according to
results"; and (2) "local units" doing most of the problem-solving
but which are "accountable to the center, and to their local
constituents, who participate in formulating its plans, and judge it
both against those goals and in comparison to the performance of
other locales in like circumstances."' 196  Key parameters in
experimentation involving the state are, again, transparency and
participation by diverse affected actors to prompt access to-and
effective use of-information, with the objective of developing
collaborative and effective relations.
Important trends in this direction in Japan nowadays include
sweeping deregulation programs, although these have tended to
get bogged down in detail and bureaucracy; 197 enactment of
194 Helper et al., supra note 42, at 477-81.
195 Michael Doff & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
196 Charles Sabel & Rory O'Donnell, Democratic Experimentalism: What To Do
About Wicked Problems after Whitehall (and What Scotland May Just Possibly Already
be Doing) Part 6 (Feb. 28-29, 2000) (paper presented at the OECD Conference on
"Devolution and Globalization: Implications for Local Decision-Makers"), at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/glasPO.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
197 Akira Kawamoto, Unblocking Japanese Reform, 216 OECD OBSERVER, Mar.
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nationwide official information disclosure legislation;'98
comprehensive proposals in mid-2001 for reform of the entire
system for administering justice in Japan;'99 more engagement
with foreigners and foreign models, although still often too
reactive and lacking in vision;20  some legal recognition of
previously marginalized ethnic groups; 20' and adroit attempts by
other minorities to avoid "bureaucratic capture" while improving
their lot.20 2 To be sure, steps may have been more faltering than in
some neighboring countries, like Korea.2 3  Yet significant
momentum has been generated in Japan over the last decade,
pointing the way towards more sustained polyarchic "deliberative
democracy. ' ,2 4 This adds further contingencies, and difficulties in
assessing existing and potential changes in Japanese corporate
governance. But these more political dimensions may prove to be
the most crucial, despite having been overlooked by most
commentators, especially those writing for law reviews, in the
debate so far.20 ' The seeming paralysis of Japanese policy-makers
1999, at 5, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php?aid=5 (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
198 Narufumi Kadomatsu, The New Administrative Information Disclosure Law in
Japan, 8 ZEITSCHRiFr FUER JAPANISCHES RECHT 34 (1999), available at http://
www.djjv.org/japrecht/heft8/abhandlungen/kadomatsu.html.
199 Tom Ginsburg, Luke Nottage & Hiroo Sono, The Worlds, Vicissitudes, and
Futures of Japan's Law, in THE MULTIPLE WORLDS OF JAPANESE LAW: DISJUNCTIONS
AND CONJUNCTIONS 1, 13 (Tom Ginsburg, Luke Nottage & Hiroo Sono, eds., 2001).
200 Clark, supra note 185.
201 Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional
Protection of Japan's Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the U.S. and
Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419,423 (2001).
202 Karen Nakamura, Manipulating the System from Within: Deaf Civil Society
Organisations in Japan (Apr. 6-7, 2001) (paper presented at the University of Michigan
Conference, "Change Continuity and Context: Japanese Law in the Twenty-First
Century") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
203 Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the Developmental State? Administrative Procedure
Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming).
204 Cf generally Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 5
EUR. L. J. 313 (1997), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/DDP.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation) (defending directly-deliberative polyarchy as a viable alternative to current
governance structures).
205 Recently, however, Fort and Schipani have advocated various corporate
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over the last decade, despite the welter of woeful economic news
described in the opening quote in this paper,2 °6 can then be seen in
a more positive light. Perhaps it shows important elements of
"democratic experimentalism," with (1) central authorities slowly
reassessing key building blocks after extensive analysis of world-
wide trends, but (2) leaving it primarily to social-economic sub-
units (such as major stakeholders in firms, including creditors and
employees, with their peak associations) to find a new balance and
form of governance combining efficiency with normative
acceptability.20 7  However, such a positive assessment turns
governance mechanisms based rather similarly on the firm as "mediating institution,"
premised on empowerment and "participants within the organization [having] the
requisite voice and power to have economic and non-economic concerns expressed and
integrated into their business communities." Fort & Schipani, supra note 189, at 865.
Cf Leon Wolff, Private Governance of Public Rights in Japan: Revisiting the Japanese
Governance Debate, 302 PAC. ECON. PAPERS 3.21-3.23 (2000) (discussing the problems
that may arise when policymaking and regulations are left to corporations).
Ballon and Honda argue that "the challenge of business lies in fostering the capacity
to learn and the willingness to learn, namely, to learn from other stakeholders about the
vagaries of the market, of technology, of administration, and so on, and to learn how to
overcome the steady obsolescence of skills and physical assets." BALLON & HONDA,
supra note 31, at xviii (emphasis in original). But their later discussion of the "national
context," especially of allegedly pervasive "government paternalism," follows
conventional wisdom in depicting a system that generates considerable information, but
through more hierarchical methods involving considerable exclusion of potential
participants. Id. at 74-79.
Finally, Mark Roe has long argued in general terms for the importance of path
dependency in the national evolution (or otherwise) of corporate governance regimes,
and has recently applied these insights to analyze lifelong employment in Japan. See
Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 165 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds.,
1997); Gilson & Roe, supra note 146, at 517-18. However, although the starting point
in this analysis is political contingency (like the deal reached between managers and/or
politicians and a segment of the labor force soon after World War 11 in Japan), the
system is then reproduced and perhaps-but often not-changed following cost-benefit
assessments by actors in the circumstances. The approach is therefore primarily a
"utilitarian" variant of path dependence theory. Cf. James Mahoney, Path Dependence,
29 THEORY AND SOC'Y 507, 517 (2000) (pointing out a number of other variants).
Sabel's approach, and hence that presented in Part V of this article, implies elements also
of a "legitimation" variant of path dependency, whereby the "institution is reproduced
because actors believe it is morally just or appropriate," and is then transformed due to
"changes in the values or subjective beliefs of actors." See Sabel, supra note 192.
206 See supra note I and accompanying text.
207 Cf., e.g., MARK WEST, THE PUZZLING DIVERGENCE OF CORPORATE LAW:
EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS FROM JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 31-34, 62 (John M.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 27
crucially on whether the Japanese state is-and will remain-
committed to fostering information flows and decentralized
participation in decision-making among diverse socio-economic
groups.
VI. Conclusions
Overall, the combination of globalization, deregulation, and
recession in Japan throughout the 1990s has generated more
systematic change than predicted or implied by many proponents
of "varieties of capitalism" theory.208 To monitor relations in
central areas of corporate governance straddling key factors of
production in contemporary economies, such as employees and
suppliers of equity or debt capital, there have been important shifts
towards more arm's length or shareholder-based control-oriented
strategies. These have occurred primarily in practices and
expectations, but also (perhaps increasingly) in legislative rules.209
Olin Center for Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 00-011), at
http://papers.ssm.com, reprinted in 150 U. PENN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002))
(discussing the role of advisory committees in the development of policy) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
208 See supra Part I.
209 See Milhaupt, supra note 86, at 16 ("The experience of the past decade . . .
strongly indicates that Japanese corporate actors respond rapidly and voraciously to legal
reform .... "). Focusing elsewhere on social norms, Milhaupt concludes that there are
other major transformations underway in business and government which are pushing
Japan towards a shareholder-centered ideology:
Increased acceptance of the takeover as a legitimate tool of corporate strategy
and monitoring (and a concomitant reduction of legal and structural
impediments to M&A), a heightened awareness of shareholders' economic
expectations, a change in managerial mindset about its proper role in running
the firm, diminished social expectations of forbearance on the part of banks and
their regulators, and rising ambivalence about the benefits of seniority-based
employment practices. These shifts are palpable and important. Taken together
with the emerging evidence of parallel norm shifts underway in Europe, they
portend a much narrower ideological spectrum on how and for whose benefits
firms should be managed.
Milhaupt, supra 58, at 2125-26.
However, he adds: "the rapidity and extent of Japanese normative convergence
towards the Anglo-American model should not be overstated. While signs of norm shifts
are very recent, evidence of the inefficiency of the old norm structure surfaced nearly a
decade ago. And signs of norm stickiness are abundant." Id. Milhaupt also observes that
changes in corporate law appear to have lagged behind significant changes in norms,
such as new board structures. Id. at 2127. Yet he notes that such changes have recently
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Yet the transformations are most pronounced in the stakeholder
relationships among managers and employees, 2'0 and perhaps
creditors, 21  and less obvious-but still significant-in labor
markets.21 2  Further, a rather different set of norms and
arrangements may continue to characterize some important sectors
of industrial production. Driven by information-sharing to
develop and maintain trust, this may also reflect and support more
participatory "democratic experimentalism" in the Japanese
213state. Such conflicting tendencies at different levels further
undermine influential theories of "varieties of capitalism," which
tend to see high degrees of internal consistency within such
systems of economic and political ordering. They also raise
doubts about the suggestion that "high trust" varieties (such as
Germany's system of capitalist organization, but perhaps also
Japan's) may disintegrate into "low-trust" or market-based
varieties (arguably, the Anglo-American model), but not vice
versa. 2" Finally, because democratic experimentalism is common
to the United States and Britain as well, a deeper level of
convergence appears to be emerging in Japan. But how various
experiments play out in these countries, especially in reorienting
Japanese corporate governance in its broadest sense, could well
differ, leaving some important divergences.
been mooted. Viewing corporate governance more broadly, moreover, the legislative
changes affecting labor relations have come remarkably quickly.
Finally, even when focusing on the development of corporate law rules, West may
be overstating divergence in post-war Japan and the United States by focusing on
(declining) numbers of "functionally similar" common rules. West, supra note 207, at
21-29. Although he does attempt to break down this quantitative analysis by dividing
them into mandatory versus enabling rules, a more qualitative judgment as to which of
these rules are more important seems essential to judge overall divergence versus
convergence. Id. Also important is the starting point: the big shift (convergence) to
more shareholder-oriented rules soon after World War II. Subsequent divergence from
this new base-line may be decidedly less important in practical terms.
210 See supra Part II.
211 See supra Part III.
212 See supra Part IV.
213 See supra Part IV.
214 Hall & Soskice, supra note 9.
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